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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO AWARD RON CASE 
ROOFING PREJUDGMENT AND POSTJUDGMENT INTEREST AT THE 
RATE SPECIFIED IN THE CONTRACT. 
This Court should reverse the trial court and award Ron Case Roofing 
prejudgment and postjudgment interest at the rate agreed to in the contract because Ron 
Case Roofing is entitled as a matter of law. Sturzenegger's incorrect assertion that Ron 
Case Roofing failed to marshal the evidence against the trial court's findings of fact 
regarding the award of interest fails for two reasons. First, the award of interest is a 
conclusion of law, not a finding of fact. Second, the marshaling requirement does not 
apply to challenges to conclusions of law. Moreover, the trial court's refusal to award 
prejudgment and postjudgment interest at the rate specified in the contract was error 
because Sturzenegger breached the contract and the interest should not be a penalty for 
the roofing deficiencies. Finally, Sturzenegger has not satisfied the judgment with her 
conditional payment to the trial court and postjudgment interest continues to accrue. 
A. Award of prejudgment and postjudgment interest is a conclusion of law. 
Sturzenegger alleges that "the trial court determined that it had not received 
sufficient evidence through photos, testimony, or expert testimony to award pre- and 
post-judgment interest to the Appellants." (Resp't Br. 15.) Sturzenegger continues by 
suggesting that this was "the trial court's explicit finding." (Resp't Br. 16.) Sturzenegger 
does not cite to the Record for these unsupportable propositions. The transcript of the 
trial is devoid of this supposed "explicit" determination. The Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law are similarly silent. An examination of the Record reveals that the 
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trial court's sole reasoning and ruling with regard to the award of prejudgment and 
postjudgment interest was: 
So the next question is whether we ought to require, under these 
circumstances and the whole picture require the defendant to pay interest 
and particularly interest at a fairly high rate for a contract which, the 
performance of which there may, there may very well be some deficiencies, 
and it seems to the Court that, that it would not be appropriate to assess an 
interest component in this situation. 
(R. at 363:240.) Clearly, the trial court did not base this determination on a lack of 
evidence, and Sturzenegger's assertions otherwise are without merit. The trial court 
instead made this determination as a penalty against Ron Case Roofing for certain 
deficiencies. As discussed below, however, the trial court improperly denied Ron Case 
Roofing the contractual interest to which Sturzenegger had agreed. 
B. The marshaling requirement does not apply to conclusions of law. 
Sturzenegger alleges that the marshaling requirement applies to Ron Case 
Roofing's challenge to the trial court's failure to award prejudgment and postjudgment 
interest at the rated specified in the contract. Sturzenegger does not recognize that "the 
marshaling requirement applies only to challenges of factual findings, not to conclusions 
of law." Peirce v. Peirce, 2000 UT 7, U 17 n.4, 994 P.2d 193, 198. As discussed above, 
the trial court's decision was a conclusion of law, not a finding of fact. Therefore, the 
marshaling requirement does not apply. 
C. The Court should award prejudgment interest because this is not an action 
for equitable relief 
Sturzenegger erroneously argues that "denial of prejudgment interest is 
appropriate when the action is for equitable relief." (Resp't Br. 17.) While the law 
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Sturzenegger cites is good law, it is wholly inapplicable to the instant matter. 
Sturzenegger relies on Bellon v. Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089 (Utah 1991), where the assignees 
of a defaulting vendee sued the vendor for restitution of payments made prior to default 
and forfeiture. In reaching the point of law Sturzenegger cites from this case, the Utah 
Supreme Court noted that in cases in which prejudgment interest was awarded, "the loss 
had been fixed as of a definite time and the amount of the loss can be calculated with 
mathematical accuracy in accordance with well-established rules of damages." Id at 
1097. The court continued by recognizing "the highly equitable nature of this action 
where the court has discretion in determining the amount, if any, to be returned to the 
defaulting vendee." IdL 
In contrast, the instant matter is not of a "highly equitable nature" because the 
primary cause of action for which the trial court granted relief to Ron Case Roofing was 
breach of contract. (R. at 255,If 11.) Ron Case Roofing did not pursue its unjust 
enrichment cause of action at trial. (R. at 363:196.) Thus, the instant matter falls under 
the category in which the Bellon court noted the regular award of prejudgment interest— 
that is, cases in which "the loss had been fixed as of a definite time and the amount of the 
loss can be calculated with mathematical accuracy in accordance with well-established 
rules of damages." Bellon, 808 P.2d 1097. 
In "contract cases," like the instant matter, "interest on amounts found to be due in 
judicial proceedings is recovery to which the creditor is entitled as a matter of law." 
Lignell v. Berg, 593 P.2d 800, 809 (Utah 1979) (emphasis added). The instant case is a 
"contract case" because the action included enforcement of a construction contract, and 
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the trial court found that Ron Case Roofing is due the principal amount of $10,264.00 for 
Sturzenegger's breach of the contract. Therefore, Ron Case Roofing is entitled to recover 
interest on that amount as a matter of law. 
While Sturzenegger's argument only applies to the award of prejudgment interest, 
it bears repeating that the trial court has no discretion to deny the award of postjudgment 
interest pursuant to a contract. Utah Code section 15-1-4 states in pertinent part that "a 
judgment rendered on a lawful contract shall conform to the contract and shall bear the 
interest agreed upon by the parties, which shall be specified in the judgment." Utah Code 
Ann. § 15-l-4(2)(a) (2005) (emphasis added). The parties agreed to the postjudgment 
interest rate of thirty-six percent per annum in their lawful contract. (R. at 10, f 2; R. at 
253, Tf 97.) Accordingly, postjudgment interest should accrue at this rate as the statute 
provides. 
In sum, Sturzenegger's argument that the trial court properly denied the award of 
prejudgment interest is without merit. It was also error for the trial court to deny Ron 
Case Roofing postjudgment interest at the rate specified in the contract. This Court 
should reverse the trial court and award Ron Case Roofing prejudgment and 
postjudgment interest at the rate of thirty-six percent per annum as the parties agreed in 
the contract. 
D. The trial court improperly denied Ron Case Roofing prejudgment and 
postjudgment interest at the agreed rate as an additional penalty for 
roofing deficiencies. 
As noted above, the trial court did not award Ron Case Roofing prejudgment and 
postjudgment interest at the rate specified in the contract because of roofing deficiencies. 
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(R. at 363:240.) As discussed in Section III. below, the trial court had already offset the 
principal amount owing Ron Case Roofing by $1,500 due to these same roofing 
deficiencies. In essence, the trial court twice penalized Ron Case Roofing for the same 
roofing deficiencies. 
Denying the interest component of the debt was an improper penalty because 
interest "is as much an integral part of the debt as the principal itself." Farnworth v. 
Jensen, 217 P.2d 571, 575 (Utah 1950) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
Interest is not a bonus to Ron Case Roofing, rather it "simply serves to compensate a 
party for the depreciating value of the amount owed over time and, as a corollary, deters 
parties from intentionally withholding an amount that is liquidated and owing." Trail 
Mountain Coal Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands & Forestry, 921 P.2d 1365, 1370 (Utah 
1996). Accordingly, this Court should reverse the trial court and award Ron Case 
Roofing the prejudgment and postjudgment interest it rightfully deserves pursuant to the 
terms of the contract. 
E. Sturzenegger did not satisfy the judgment because the payment was 
conditional and not made to Ron Case Roofing. 
As expected, Sturzenegger argues that postjudgment interest should not accrue 
because she satisfied the Judgment on the date it was entered. (Resp't Br. 18.) This 
argument is without merit because Sturzenegger's "payment" to the trial court was not 
delivered to Ron Case Roofing and is conditioned upon Ron Case Roofing satisfying the 
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judgment and dismissing its appeal.1 Sturzenegger should have made an unconditional 
payment of the judgment amount to Ron Case Roofing if she truly wanted to avoid the 
postjudgment interest. By conditioning the payment to the trial court, Sturzenegger has 
not satisfied the judgment and postjudgment interest continues to accrue. 
In conclusion, this Court should reverse the trial court and award Ron Case 
Roofing prejudgment and postjudgment interest at the rate specified in the contract 
because a creditor is entitled to interest as a matter of law and Ron Case Roofing and 
Sturzenegger agreed to a specific interest rate in the Contract. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW RON CASE 
ROOFING TO FORECLOSE ITS MECHANIC'S LIEN ON THE 
PROPERTY BECAUSE IT HAD NO AUTHORITY TO DO SO. 
This Court should reverse the trial court and allow Ron Case Roofing to foreclose 
its mechanic's lien on the Sturzenegger property because the mechanic's lien statute 
provides foreclosure as a non-discretionary remedy. Sturzenegger argues that a trial 
court's refusal to foreclose will only be reversed if its decision was arbitrary or 
capricious. For this proposition, Sturzenegger cites Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. Neilson, 
490 P.2d 328 (Utah 1971). Although the court in Walker Bank did not specifically 
explain why it was using an arbitrary or capricious standard of review, it did note that 
"[t]he appellant elected not to bring . . . any of the testimony presented to the trial court, 
and so [the appellate court] must presume such findings as were made to be based upon 
lrThe letter of January 12, 2006, from Jason H. Robinson, attorney for Ron Case Roofing, 
to Tyler B. Ayres, attorney for Sturzenegger, describes the conditions on the monies 
deposited with the trial court. (R. at 344-45.) 
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competent and substantial evidence." IcL at 329. It is telling that no other case cites 
Walker Bank for this proposition; it is unique to Walker Bank. 
It is likely helpful to explain that in Walker Bank, the bank sued to foreclose on 
the security under a trust deed for defendants' failure to make payments under the note. 
The trial court found that substantial compliance had been made regarding the payments 
on the note and refused to allow the plaintiff to proceed with its foreclosure action until 
the defendants had an opportunity to bring the loan current. The court ultimately held 
that "[i]t thus appears from the decree of the court that the amount of money held by the 
clerk was exactly equal to the amount due under the note and trust deed, and we cannot 
say that the court's order refusing foreclosure was arbitrary or capricious." Id at 330. 
Thus, it appears that the arbitrary or capricious review was related to the unavailability of 
testimony presented to the trial court and has no bearing on the instant matter. 
In the instant matter, the Utah mechanic's lien statute provides that "[t]he court 
shall cause the property to be sold in satisfaction of the liens and costs as in the case of 
foreclosure of mortgages, subject to the same right of redemption." Utah Code Ann. § 
38-1-15 (2005) (emphasis added). Under the mechanic's lien statute, the trial court did 
not have discretion to bar foreclosure, but it did so anyway. 
Sturzenegger raises a number of points that are entirely irrelevant to this issue. 
The offset award to Sturzenegger and the expert testimony had no bearing on the trial 
court's decision as to the lien foreclosure, and Sturzenegger's inclusion of the unrelated 
information merely confuses the issue. 
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Furthermore, as anticipated, Sturzenegger argues that foreclosure is unnecessary 
because she "satisfied the Judgment." (Resp't Br. 20.) Again, this argument is without 
merit because Sturzenegger's "payment" is conditional and was not delivered to Ron 
Case Roofing. (R. at 344-45.) Ron Case Roofing is entitled to collect on its judgment 
without waiving its right to appeal. Additionally, an increase in the award to Ron Case 
Roofing by success on appeal necessitates having foreclosure as a mechanism for 
obtaining relief. Sturzenegger's payment to the trial court will not satisfy any additional 
award, and there is no guarantee that Sturzenegger will voluntarily pay any amount in 
excess of the trial court's judgment. 
In conclusion, this Court should reverse the trial court and allow Ron Case 
Roofing to foreclose on its mechanic's lien on Sturzenegger's property pursuant to the 
Utah mechanic's lien statute. Sturzenegger has not satisfied the judgment with her 
conditional payment to the trial court. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING STURZENEGGER 
DAMAGES IN THE FORM OF OFFSETS BECAUSE THE AWARD WAS 
BASED ON SPECULATION RATHER THAN EVIDENCE OF DAMAGES. 
This Court should reverse the trial court and deny Sturzenegger offsets for the 
master bedroom ceiling damage and the roofing deficiencies because there was no 
reasonable basis to support the trial court's award of damages. The extensive case law 
Sturzenegger cites regarding the standard of review for the award of damages only 
reinforces that there must be "a reasonable basis" for the award. Lefavi v. Bertoch, 2000 
UT App 5, If 16, 994 P.2d 817, 821; see also Atkin Wright & Miles v. Mountain States 
Tel. & Tel. Co., 709 P.2d 330, 336 (Utah 1985) ("[T]here still must be evidence that rises 
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above speculation and provides a reasonable . . . estimate of damages.") That is, "an 
award of damages based only on speculation cannot be upheld." Bastian v. King, 661 
P.2d 953, 956 (Utah 1983). 
Logic demands that without evidence related to the amount of damages, there is no 
reasonable basis to support a damages award because to prove damages, a party must 
prove (1) "the fact of damages" and (2) "the amount of damages." Atkin Wright, 709 
P.2d at 336. In this matter, there was no evidence of the amount of damages 
Sturzenegger sustained for the master bedroom ceiling damage and the roofing 
deficiencies. 
The only testimony related to the amount paid for the repair of the damage to the 
master bedroom ceiling was Sturzenegger's testimony that she paid $3,000 for the 
repairs. (R. at 363:138.) Sturzenegger's expert witness did not testify as to the amount 
of damage in dollars the master bedroom ceiling sustained or the reasonableness of the 
$3,000 payment for the repairs. (R. at 363:214-31.) The trial court even stated in its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that "[t]here was no evidence presented at trial 
that the $3,000.00" Sturzenegger paid "was a reasonable amount." (R. at 256, Tj 19.) 
Sturzenegger concedes that she "failed to bring evidence to court regarding the amount." 
(Resp'tBr.23.) 
Sturzenegger argues that "the trial court recognized that, had it allowed 
[Sturzenegger's] counsel to take a recess during trial, [Sturzenegger] would have been 
able to provide the evidence to support the price of $3000.00. Therefore, the trial court 
reduced the amount of the offset." (Resp't Br. 23.) Sturzenegger does not cite to the 
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Record for this assertion because the Record is devoid of any such recognition or 
reasoning. The simple fact is that Sturzenegger did not present evidence, even through 
Sturzenegger's expert witness, as to the amount of the master bedroom ceiling damage. 
Instead, the trial court used "Kentucky windage numbers" to make its determination. (R. 
at 256, Tf 20.) Without evidence as to the amount of damages, this determination is 
without a reasonable basis and can only be based on speculation, which cannot be upheld. 
As with the master bedroom damage, Sturzenegger's expert witness did not testify 
as to the dollar value of any of the alleged roof deficiencies. (R. at 214-31.) The trial 
court again stated in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that "[t]here was no 
evidence presented at trial as to the dollar value of the deficiencies." (R. at 257, |^ 22.) 
Curiously, Sturzenegger does not address this error, other than to make reference 
to the roof deficiencies in discussing the trial court's reason for changing the cost of 
replacement sheeting from the cost provided in the contract, (p.24) This issue is 
discussed in Section IV. below. In any event, the trial court's determination as to the roof 
deficiencies offset was without a reasonable basis, only speculative, and cannot be 
upheld. 
In sum, the trial court's award of speculative offsets despite there being no 
evidence as to the amount of Sturzenegger's damages for the repair of the bedroom 
ceiling and the roofing deficiencies was incorrect and should be reversed because it was 
based on speculation rather than evidence. 
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IV. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE CHANGED AN EXPRESS 
PROVISION OF THE CONTRACT BECAUSE THERE WAS NO 
JUSTIFICATION AND NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT ITS CHANGE. 
By changing the replacement cost of sheeting specified in the contract, the trial 
court ignored the lack of justification and evidentiary basis for doing so. Sturzenegger 
asserts that the trial court interfered with an express provision of the contract regarding 
the replacement cost of sheeting because there were "certain deficiencies with the roof 
system installed by Ron Case Roofing." (Resp't Br. 24.) This assertion is incorrect. The 
trial court, in altering the contract price, reasoned: 
The $7,314 for the additional sheeting, being at the "top end of the, of the 
range of what might be reasonable under these circumstances", I think 
needs to be moderated because of what I've said, in terms of the, what I 
think was the lack of reasonable approach by the contractor under these 
circumstances. So I'm going to, I don't know if the word penalize is the 
right word, but I'm going to deduct from that $7,314 an amount which I 
roughly have calculated at, instead of a buck 59 per foot I'm calculating at a 
buck and a quarter per foot. I think that's, that will reduce that price 
according to my calculations roughly $1,600 on the sheeting that went on 
that roof. 
(R. at 363:237.) The "lack of reasonable approach" to which the trial court refers is Ron 
Case Roofing's decision, using its best judgment, to replace the sheeting pursuant to 
provision 13 of the contract.2 (R. at 363:236.) The trial court did not say it was altering 
the contract sum for the sheeting because of the roofing deficiencies. 
"If a problem should arise and workmen cannot contact Customer, Contractor 
will proceed with job utilizing Contractor's best judgment. In the event that 
additional costs are incurred by Contractor under these circumstances, Customer 
authorizes Contractor to proceed with the project and agrees to pay any increase in 
costs." (Ex. 6; R. at 10,113; R. at 245, f 50.) 
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The trial court altered the contract price for the sheeting to $1.25 per square foot 
even though the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law state that "there was no 
evidence presented as to a different amount that should have been charged for the 
sheeting, other than the $1.59 per square foot amount set forth in the Contract, for the 
sheeting." (R. at 246, % 57.) 
It could be argued that the trial court's interference with the sheeting price in the 
contract was harmless error because the trial court could have reduced the sheeting 
amount under the contract by determining that Ron Case Roofing should have installed 
sheeting over a smaller area of the roof. This alternative determination, however, is 
unsupported by evidence. At trial, the expert for Ron Case Roofing testified that the 
installation of new roof sheeting for the substrate was appropriate. (R. at 363:155.) The 
expert for Sturzenegger testified that he did not have enough information to form an 
opinion as to whether the sheeting should have been replaced. (R. at 363:226-27.) 
This Court should reverse the trial court's legal conclusion of a different material 
cost than that to which the parties agreed and for which the express terms of the contract 
provide because the contract was integrated and unambiguous, making judicial 
interference with the terms of the contract improper. Furthermore, while the trial court 
intended to penalize Ron Case Roofing with this interference, it cannot arbitrarily reduce 
the contract amount without some evidence supporting the $1.25 per square foot. 
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V. THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES SHOULD BE INCREASED TO 
REFLECT RON CASE ROOFING'S SUCCESS ON APPEAL, AND RON 
CASE ROOFING IS ENTITLED TO ITS ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL, 
Ron Case Roofing is entitled to an increase in the trial court's award of attorney 
fees for its increased success on appeal and for its attorney fees for bringing this appeal. 
Sturzenegger mistakenly asserts that Ron Case Roofing is not entitled to additional 
attorney fees on appeal because only successful defendants on appeal are so entitled. 
(Resp't Br. 27.) Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d 143 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), provides 
otherwise. Brown states the general rule that "when a party who received attorney fees 
below prevails on appeal, the party is also entitled to fees reasonably incurred on appeal." 
Id. at 156. Brown also evidences that an appellant can recover attorney fees on appeal 
even though the appellant prevailed at the trial court. IcL 
Many other cases show that a plaintiff who prevails on appeal is entitled to 
attorney fees pursuant to a contractual attorney fee provision. E.g., Dixon v. Stoddard, 
765 P.2d 879, 881 (Utah 1988) ("[A] provision for payment of attorney fees in a contract 
includes attorney fees incurred by the prevailing party on appeal as well as at trial if the 
action is brought to enforce the contract."); Rosenlof v. Sullivan, 676 P.2d 372, 
376 (Utah 1983) (remanding for a determination of reasonable attorney fees to plaintiff 
for success on appeal); Alexander v. Brown, 646 P.2d 692, 695 (Utah 1982) 
("Defendants, who agreed in their earnest money contract 'to pay all expenses of 
enforcing this agreement, or of any right arising out of the breach thereof, including a 
reasonable attorney's fee,' are also liable to plaintiffs for reasonable attorney's fees 
incurred on appeal."). 
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Sturzenegger also alleges that Ron Case Roofing's appeal is not based on 
enforcing the contract so that attorney fees on appeal would not be recoverable under 
Management Services Corp. v. Development Associates, 617 P.2d 406, 409 (Utah 1980) 
("[A] provision for payment of attorney's fees in a contract includes attorney's fees 
incurred by the prevailing party on appeal as well as at trial, if the action is brought to 
enforce the contract.") Ron Case Roofing's action was brought to enforce the contract, 
and while it was the prevailing party following trial, the trial court did not award Ron 
Case Roofing all of the relief to which it is entitled. Accordingly, most of the issues of 
this appeal arise from the contract and Ron Case Roofing's need to protect its position 
under the contract. 
Although Ron Case Roofing has not "defended" its position against an appeal 
from Sturzenegger, the purpose of the attorney fee provision, as noted in Management 
Services, is equally applicable here: "The purpose of a provision for attorney's fees is to 
indemnify the creditor or the prevailing party against the necessity of paying an 
attorney's fee and to enable him to recover the full amount of the obligation." Id Ron 
Case Roofing had to appeal to obtain the full relief to which it is entitled. This Court 
should not penalize Ron Case Roofing for doing so by denying Ron Case Roofing its 
attorney fees and costs on appeal. 
It bears repeating that Ron Case Roofing does not dispute that the trial court was 
entitled to determine an award of attorney fees and costs to Ron Case Roofing as the 
prevailing party and does not challenge the trial court's reasoning itself. With the 
increased success Ron Case Roofing obtains on appeal, however, this Court should 
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proportionally adjust the trial court's award of attorney fees and costs. The issues now on 
appeal factored into the trial court's determination of Ron Case Roofing's success and the 
actual result obtained. It is only proper for the award of attorney fees to Ron Case 
Roofing to be increased to reflect the greater extent Ron Case Roofing prevails on its 
claims before this Court and for this Court to award Ron Case Roofing its attorney fees 
and costs on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons contained herein, Ron Case Roofing respectfully requests that this 
Court reverse the trial court's legal conclusions with regard to the award of interest, 
mechanic's lien foreclosure, the damages offsets, and interference with the contract. 
Additionally, Ron Case Roofing respectfully requests an award of its attorney fees and 
costs on appeal, in addition to an adjustment of the trial court's award of attorney fees to 
which Ron Case Roofing is entitled in relation to its additional success on appeal. 
DATED t h i s ^ ^ d a y of July, 2006. 
BABCOCK SCOTT & BABCOCK 
Tason H. Robinson 
Adam T. Mow 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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